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One of the most salient explanations for the distinctive path of economic and political development
of the United States is captured by the 'Frontier (or Turner) thesis'. Turner argued that it was the presence
of the open frontier which explained why the United States became democratic and, at least implicitly,
prosperous. In this paper we provide a simple test of this idea. We begin with the contradictory observation
that almost every Latin American country had a frontier in the 19th century as well. We show that
while the data does not support the Frontier thesis, it is consistent with a more complex 'conditional
Frontier thesis.' In this view, the effect of the frontier is conditional on the way that the frontier was
allocated and this in turn depends on political institutions at the time of frontier expansion. We show
that for countries with the worst political institutions, there is a negative correlation between the historical
extent of the frontier and contemporary income per-capita. For countries with better political institutions
this correlation is positive. Though the effect of the frontier on democracy is positive irrespective of
initial political institutions, it is larger the better were these institutions. In essence, Turner saw the
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One of the great economic puzzles of the modern world is why, amongst a group of colonies
founded at more or less the same time in the early modern period, by more or less rapacious
Europeans, with more or less the same intentions, North America became such an economic
and democratic success, while Latin America did not. There is no shortage of candidates, of
course, but one of the most prominent is the notion of the ￿ Frontier￿ .1 Many scholars have
claimed that a crucial aspect of the uniqueness of the United States was the vastness of the open
spaces (at least after the indigenous peoples had died, Mann, 2005) which heavily in￿ uenced
the way society, economy and polity evolved.
The most famous exposition of this view, ￿rst developed in 1893, was due to Frederick
Jackson Turner. Turner, postulating what has become known as the ￿ Frontier (or Turner)
thesis￿argued that the availability of the frontier had led to a particular type of person and
had crucially determined the path of US society.
￿The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of
American settlement westward, explain American Development.
Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modi￿cations, lie the vital
forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions.￿
Turner (1920, pp. 1-2)
Turner emphasized that the frontier created strong individualism and social mobility and
his most forthright claim is that it was critical to the development of democracy. He noted
￿the most important e⁄ect of the frontier has been to promote democracy￿Turner
(1920, p. 30)
and
￿These free lands promoted individualism, economic equality, freedom to rise,
democracy ... American democracy is fundamentally the outcome of the expe-
riences of the American people in dealing with the West.￿Turner (1920, pp. 259,
266)
1For other ideas on this topic of the exceptionalism of the United States see Hartz (1955, 1964), Lipset
(1996), Engerman and Sokolo⁄ (1997).
1Moreover, the things that went along with democracy and helped to promote it, such as
social mobility, most likely also stimulated economic performance.
Since Turner wrote, the ￿ Frontier Thesis￿has become part of the conventional wisdom
amongst historians and scholars of the United States.2 Though the speci￿c mechanisms that
Turner favored, such as individualism, have become less prominent, arguments about the
frontier have appeared in many places, particularly the literature on the democratization of
the United States (Keyssar, 2000, Engerman and Sokolo⁄, 2005). Keyssar (2000, p. xxi) argues
￿The expansion of su⁄rage in the United States was generated by a number of
key forces and factors ... These include the dynamics of frontier settlement (as
Frederick Jackson Turner pointed out a century ago).￿
Those who have contested this view (Walsh, 2005, for an excellent discussion) have tended
to focus on the extent to which the Frontier did or did not have the postulated e⁄ects within
the United States.
At some level the acceptance of the Frontier thesis and the nature of the debate is quite
surprising. This is because the existence of a frontier clearly did not distinguish the United
States from the other colonies of the Americas or indeed other societies such as Russia, South
Africa or Australia in the 19th century. Every independent South American and Caribbean
country, with the exception of Haiti, had a frontier in the 19th century. As in the United
States, these frontiers were usually inhabited by indigenous peoples and they went through the
same pattern of expansion into this zone which, as in the United States, coincided with the
expropriation and oftentimes annihilation of indigenous communities. In these cases, however,
there seems to be much less reason to associate frontier expansion with democracy or economic
development. Indeed, one could conjecture that if the Frontier thesis had been developed by
Latin American academics in the late 19th century it would have been formulated with a minus
sign in front!3
A small literature has examined the frontier hypothesis in comparative perspective, but
it has come to inconclusive results. Turner did engage in some comparative observations but
refers only to Europe, noting
￿The American frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier - a
forti￿ed boundary line running through dense populations.￿(Turner, 1920, p. 3)
2For some of the debate about the applicability of this thesis to the United States see Taylor (1956), Billington
(1962, 1966, 2001), Hofstadter and Lipset ed. (1968) and Walsh (2005).
3Though the issue of the role of the frontier has been considered in Latin America studies, see Hennessy
(1978) and Weber and Rausch (1994), it appears that nobody has made these comparative observations before.
2Hennessy (1978) speci￿cally addresses the applicability of the Frontier thesis to Latin Amer-
ica (see also the papers in Weber and Rausch, 1994).4 Noting the absence of a literature on
the Frontier thesis in Latin America Hennessy (1978, p. 13) reasons
￿If the importance of the Turner thesis lies in its ... ability to provide a legitimating
and fructifying nationalist ideology, then the absence of a Latin American frontier
myth is easy to explain. Without democracy, there was no compulsion to elaborate
a supportive ideology based on frontier experiences.￿
Hennessy￿ s general conclusion is that the thesis is irrelevant because
￿Latin American frontiers have not provided fertile ground for democracy. The
concentration of wealth and the absence of capital and of highly motivated pioneers
e⁄ectively blocked the growth of independent smallholders and a rural middle class￿
(Hennessy, 1978, p. 129)
The correlation between good outcomes and the frontier in the United States and Canada
but the lack of such a correlation in Latin America raises the question of whether or not in
general there is any connection between the frontier and economic and political development.
Maybe the frontier was irrelevant? A myth?
We believe the answer to this is no. Some of the mechanisms described in the case of the
United States certainly seem plausible, it is just that they don￿ t seem to have operated in
Latin America. The key to understanding why comes from examining how frontier land was
allocated.5 In the United States it was the 1862 Homestead Act which played a major role in
governing who and on what terms had access to the frontier. In Latin America, on the other
hand, only Costa Rica and Colombia passed and enforced legislation which resembled measures
such as these. In a few other countries where some legislation was passed, it seems to have
never been put into practice. Je⁄erson (1926, p. 167), for example, points out the di⁄erence
between the ￿elevated aims and philanthropic language￿of the Argentine legislation regarding
landowning in frontier areas and ￿the actuality of events￿ . More generally, frontier land was
allocated in a relatively inegalitarian pattern by existing elites, and property rights over frontier
lands of settlers were in many cases weak for non-elites. Though Turner continually talks about
4Other work looking, usually critically, at the Frontier thesis is comparative perspective include Winks (1971),
Miller (1977), and Powell (1981). For more general discussions of frontier expansions in the modern world not
focused on the Turner thesis see Richards (2003) and Belich (2009).
5Di⁄erences in labor institutions developed in frontier areas may also have played an important role, and
were no doubt related to how land was allocated.
3the frontier and ￿ free land￿as if they were the same thing, as Adelman (1994, p. 101) points
out
￿Turner ... overlooked two hard facts: land was not free, and workers had to be
brought in from outside the region.￿
Outside of Costa Rica and Colombia, frontier land was not free in Latin America and indeed
was allocated oligarchically by those with political power.6 Hennessy (1978, p. 19) observed
￿Another contrast lies in the availability of ￿ free land￿ . Whereas free land was the
magnet attracting pioneers into the North American wilderness, in Latin America
most available land had been preempted by landowning patterns set in the sixteenth
century.￿
The historical experience of Argentina is again revealing. Je⁄erson (1926 pp. 175-178)
describes several episodes in the ParanÆ basin, the NequØn region to the South or even in La
Pampa, where settlers found di¢ culties in maintaining their property rights over the lands
they opened, both because state o¢ cials reneged on past promises or because of abuses from
local elites. Interestingly, when Turner does discuss the issue of land laws with respect to the
frontier, he seems to see these as an endogenous response to the existence of the frontier, for
example arguing that
￿The disposition of the public lands was a third important subject of national
legislation in￿ uenced by the frontier￿Turner (1920, p. 25)
and
￿It is safe to say that the legislation with regard to land ... was conditioned on
frontier ideas and needs.￿Turner (1920, p. 27)
The Latin American experience suggests to us not that the frontier is irrelevant, but rather
that a more nuanced version of the Frontier thesis is required. We refer to this as the ￿ condi-
tional Frontier thesis￿ . This takes into account the fact that the consequences of the frontier
6There is a large historical literature on the oligarchic allocation of frontier lands in 19th century Latin
America. For overviews of the Central American experience see Williams (1994), Gudmundson (1997) and
Mahoney (2001); McCreery (1976, 1994) for the important Guatemalan experience; Parsons (1949) is the classic
work on frontier expansion in Colombia, see also Christie (1978) and LeGrand (1986); Dean (1971) and Butland
(1966) analyze the Brazilian case; Solberg (1969) presents the evidence for Chile; Coatsworth (1974, 1981) for
Mexico. Solberg (1987) and Adelman (1994) discuss Argentina and both books make interesting comparisons
to the di⁄erential evolution of Canada.
4are conditional on the initial political equilibrium when frontier expansion occurred. Although
the opening up of a frontier might bring new opportunities for the establishment of equitable
societies in ways that could promote democracy and economic growth, as Turner suggested,
in relatively oligarchic countries the existence of an open frontier gave the ruling elite a new
valuable instrument which they could manipulate to remain in power. They did this through
the structure of land and laws, policies towards immigrants and clientelistic access to frontier
lands. When initial political institutions were di⁄erent, as they were in the United States,
Canada, Costa Rica and Colombia, elites were less able to manipulate this resource and a
more open society evolved. As Turner argued, it is quite likely in these circumstances that
the existence of a frontier helped to induce further improvements in political institutions. In
countries like Argentina or Mexico, it is possible that an oligarchically allocated frontier was
worse than having no frontier at all.
In this paper we propose what we believe is the ￿rst empirical test of the Frontier thesis
and also our extended ￿ conditional Frontier thesis￿ . To do this we construct an estimate of the
proportion of land which was frontier in each independent country in the Americas in 1850. We
combine this with data on current income per-capita, democracy and inequality. Our ￿rst main
￿nding is that our estimates of the relative size of the frontier are positively correlated with
long-run economic growth and the extent to which countries were democratic over the 20th
century. The relative size of the frontier is also negatively correlated with income inequality.
These initial results are quite consistent with the simple Frontier thesis.
Nevertheless, we then test the ￿ conditional Frontier thesis￿by interacting the proportion
of frontier land in 1850 with measures of initial institutions, speci￿cally constraints on the
executive from the Polity dataset which is available for every independent country in the
Americas in 1850.7 When GDP per-capita in 2007 is the dependent variable we ￿nd that neither
frontier land in 1850 nor constraints on the executive are themselves statistically signi￿cant,
but their interaction is. Indeed, the results imply that for countries with the lowest level
of constraints on the executive (which is almost half our sample in 1850) long-run economic
growth is lower the larger is the frontier. For higher levels of constraints, however, long-run
growth is higher. These simple regressions are very consistent with the conditional Frontier
thesis. With respect to democracy, when we look at the average Polity Score from 1900-2007
we again ￿nd that once we add the interaction term, neither frontier nor constraints themselves
are signi￿cant. In this case we do not ￿nd that the frontier is ever bad for democracy, but
rather its￿impact on democracy is greater the greater are constraints on the executive in 1850.
7Except for Canada, for which data is available starting in 1867.
5These results suggest, again consistent with the ￿ conditional Frontier thesis,￿that the frontier
on its own had no impact on democracy. When we turn to the democracy score averaged over
the post World War II period (1950-2007) we ￿nd di⁄erent results. Here frontier on its own
tends to be positively correlated with democracy while the interaction term is not statistically
signi￿cant. Finally, when we examine contemporary inequality as the dependent variable we
do not ￿nd robust results. Though frontier and constraints on the executive in 1850 are both
negatively correlated with inequality, when we add the interaction term none of the variables
is statistically signi￿cant.
Taken seriously, our results provide quite strong support to the conditional Frontier thesis
and suggest that the reason that Turner himself and so many subsequent scholars based in
the United States may have accepted the simple Frontier thesis, is that they were living in a
country which had relatively good institutions. Nevertheless, the size of our sample is small
and we are limited to using cross-national variation, so our ￿ndings ought to be regarded as
tentative.
Our argument about the conditional e⁄ect of the frontier is related to several important
historical debates. For example, one interpretation of the arguments of Brenner (1976) is that
large shocks in the middle ages, such as trade expansion or the Black Death had conditional
e⁄ects which depended on initial institutions. In Britain where the serfs were relatively orga-
nized and where Lords did not have large estates, the Black Death empowered the lower orders
and led to the collapse of feudal institutions. In eastern Europe, however, where the initial
conditions were di⁄erent, the Black Death ultimately led to the ￿ Second Serfdom￿ . A related
argument is presented in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) who argue that the impact
on Western Europe of trade and colonial expansion after 1492 depended on initial political
institutions. In places where there were relatively strong political institutions, such as Britain
and the Netherlands, trade expansion led to improvements of institutions and stimulated eco-
nomic growth and further political change. In places which were more absolutist, such as Spain
and France, trade expansion had opposite e⁄ects.8
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss how we measure the extent of
the frontier and present some basic data about its extent and nature. In section 3 we examine
the correlation between the frontier and long run economic and political outcomes. Second 4
investigates whether or not there is a conditional e⁄ect of the frontier and section 5 concludes.
8This type of interaction also comes up in the literature of the impact of the resource curse, see Moene,
Mehlum and Torvik (2006).
62 Measuring the Frontier
The literature on the frontier has been quite vague on how exactly to determine what was or
what was not frontier. Turner himself noted (1920, p. 3)
￿In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a
density of two or more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our
purposes does not need a sharp de￿nition. We shall consider the whole frontier
belt, including the Indian country and the other outer margin of the ￿settled area￿
of the census reports.￿
It was the de￿nition of the frontier as areas with a population density of less than two
people per square mile that led the census bureau to declare in 1890 that the US frontier had
closed.
Any attempt to measure the extent of the frontier across the Americas must confront
several methodological issues. In the ￿rst place, frontiers in each country, and even within
each country, looked very di⁄erent around the mid-nineteenth century. Coming up with a
measure of the frontier for each country therefore requires a compromise to select some basic
simplifying but consistent criteria which will necessarily overlook many possibly important
dimensions. Following the historical literature the natural candidates for such a classi￿cation
are the presence or absence of native American communities not subject to state control and
authority, overall population density (including any non-native American settlers), and the
presence or absence of state institutions. All of these conditions were important determinants of
the potential availability of free land and of the possibilities for successful settlement. Obviously
problematic is that we would like to think of the frontier as a dichotomous condition, whereas
its de￿ning variables are in most cases inherently continuous, and its boundaries usually not
clear-cut.
When dealing with the frontier experience of South America another issue arises; settlement
of frontier lands was not an absorbing state in some regions. Several areas in Paraguay, for
example, were signi￿cantly settled and run by Jesuit missionaries during the colonial period.
After the expulsion of Jesuits from the Spanish Empire in 1767, the Crown reassigned the
control of these regions to other religious communities who failed to maintain the economic
viability of the missions and the political control of the indigenous communities inhabiting
the areas. As a result, in a matter of decades the missionary regions degenerated to a virtual
absence of state control and became frontiers once again. They remained as such until late in
7the 19th century (Eidt, 1971, Bandeira, 2006). The case of Brazilian bandeirantes in the 17th
and 18th centuries is similar. Brazil expanded its boundaries as these settlers moved west into
the Amazon and its south-western basin. Nonetheless, many of these areas were subsequently
unsettled and remained like that until late in the republican period. As a result, Brazilian
historiography refers to them as ￿hollow￿ frontiers (Katzman, 1977). For our purposes we
tried to include in our measure these regions, which around 1850 were in fact not controlled
by republican states even if they had been so earlier in colonial times.
Once such decisions have been made, the second issue is related to the availability of in-
formation about location of frontier and non-frontier lands. Not only is detailed information
scarce by the very nature of the subject, but the comparability of the data across countries
might also be problematic. We collected three types of information, based on which we con-
structed three alternative measures of the frontier; (a) historical cartographic data depicting
directly information on frontier territories or on population density for several of the countries
in our sample of independent republics, at di⁄erent dates starting in the mid 19th century, b)
geographic (and georeferenced) information on current-day administrative divisions (provinces,
departments or states), and c) direct country or regional historical accounts on the settlement
of frontier areas during the 19th century. The appendix contains a detailed description of the
sources used for each country. The reason that making use of current administrative divisions
is helpful is that in fact the formation of administrative units in many regions across the Amer-
icas was precisely driven by signi￿cant settlement and State presence. The best examples of
this might be the straight lines marking the boundaries of the western states of the United
States, put in place as a ￿rst e⁄ort to regulate and control the newly occupied territories as
the westward expansion moved on, or the Amazon rainforest frontier provinces of countries
like Colombia, Brazil or Peru, which were designed precisely to delimit such frontier areas.
2.1 The Frontier in the United States and Canada
For these two countries we were able to ￿nd detailed cartographic information which allowed
us to calculate the share of unsettled and settled land in 1850. More speci￿cally, for the United
States the United States Census O¢ ce (1898) and Gerlach (1970) contain detailed maps of
population density. Both sources use the 19th century United States Census data, and following
the Census Bureau, classify as frontier land the territory with less than 2 people per square mile
(0.7725 people per square kilometer). For Canada, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (n.d.)
contains maps for several years in the second half of the 19th century, depicting population
density by points on the map. We directly georeferenced these maps using GIS software, and
8computed the share of total land area of each country with population density below 0.7725
people per square kilometer, in 1850 for the United States and in 1851 for Canada. Since these
maps were based on detailed census data, we believe these frontier measures have the smallest
possible measurement error, and are the only ones we consider for these two countries.
For the rest of countries in the Americas the information is not as detailed and is more
scattered throughout di⁄erent sources. As a result, we decided to create a set of alternative
measures of the frontier, taking into account the di⁄erences we found when comparing the
available information.
2.2 The Frontier in Central America
To measure the Frontier in Central America we relied heavily in Hall and Perez-Brignoli (2003),
which contains rich historical maps for Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica and Panama, of settlement during the 19th century, and also has a thorough historical
discussion of the frontier expansion throughout the region. We merged the information of these
maps, which depict the frontier regions in each country, with a georeferenced sub-national level
map of Central America, and coded each province/department/state as frontier or non-frontier
depending on whether or not it fell into the regions considered as unsettled in the Hall and
Perez-Brignoli (2003) maps. Of course, with this procedure a considerable number of sub-
national units appeared as partially frontier areas. We thus created two di⁄erent measures of
the frontier, which we call narrow and wide. The narrow measure classi￿es as non-frontier the
sub-national units for which an ambiguous coverage of the Hall and Perez-Brignoli (2003) maps
had been obtained, while the wide measure classi￿es them a frontier. We further re￿ned the
classi￿cation of provinces using United States Bureau of the Census (1956a), which contains
very detailed population density maps for all the Central American republics in 1950 at the
province/department level. The comparison with these maps allowed us to reclassify provinces
that might have been ambiguous, but which by 1950 clearly had a population density below
0.7725 people per square kilometer, and necessarily must have been frontier areas 100 years
before. The Appendix presents the coding of each sub-national unit in its narrow and wide
versions.
For the Mexican frontier we relied on the Bureau of Business Research (1975) population
density map for 1900, a state-level map based on the 1900 Censo General de Poblaci￿n, together
with Bernstein (1964) and Hennessy (1978). Since population density in 1900 was considerably
higher than in 1850 everywhere in Mexico, we coded as frontier states not only those with less
than 0.7725 people per square kilometer in 1900, but also any State with at most a population
9density of 5 people per square kilometer in 1900, which were at the same time mentioned in
the complementary references as frontier areas. This resulted in a relatively straightforward
classi￿cation except for the state of Chiapas, which we coded as non-frontier in the narrow
measure and as frontier in the wide measure.
2.3 The Frontier in the Caribbean Republics
Only Haiti and the Dominican Republic were independent by 1850, and as such are the only two
Caribbean countries in our sample. Coding the frontier for them was a pretty straightforward
job based on Anglade (1982) and Lora (2002). Anglade presents population density maps for
the late 18th century, and mid 19th century, where it is clear that since the colonial period Haiti
had population densities well above 0.7725 people per square kilometer, and almost everywhere
signi￿cantly higher. Haiti therefore did not have a frontier. For the Dominican Republic the
picture is very similar, except possibly for the provinces of Barahona and Pedernales in the
south-western tip of the country. The United States Bureau of the Census (1956b) also contains
detailed province-level maps of these two countries in 1950, which show a low population
density in the southwest of the Dominican Republic. As a result, the narrow measure considers
Barahona and Pedernales as non-frontier, while the wide measure codes them as frontier. All
the rest of the country is coded as non-frontier.
2.4 The Frontier in South America
To measure the frontier in the South American countries we followed a procedure very similar to
the one we used for the Central American republics, merging the information in usually country-
speci￿c historical maps and accounts with current-day sub-national units. The Appendix
contains the historical references used for each country. When a sub-national unit was partially
covered by settlement we again made the distinction by coding it as non-frontier in the narrow
measure and as frontier in the wide version. This is the case, for example, of the north-eastern
Brazilian province of Piaui or the Paci￿c coast province of Esmeraldas in Ecuador.
For South America we found an alternative source for the frontier. Butland (1966), which
discusses in detail the frontier expansion in southern Brazil, presents a South American map
depicting the frontier areas in mid 19th century. Unfortunately he does not explain how this
map was drawn, but actually it coincides to a quite large extent with our own province-level
codings. We used GIS software to georeference the frontier map in Butland (1966) and directly
computed the share of each country which was frontier in the mid-19th century. As a result
we have three di⁄erent frontier measures for South America: narrow, wide and Butland.
10Table 1 sums up the data from these calculations. For the United States and Canada we
only have one number each, with 72.5% of the territory of the United States being frontier
in 1850, while the corresponding number for Canada is 85.3%. Map 1 shows exactly where
the frontier and non-frontier areas were. This is a pretty familiar picture with, for example,
the United States being settled on the eastern seaboard and all the way west to the western
boundaries of Arkansas and Missouri. Far to the west parts of coastal California and the
central valley north of San Francisco were also settled. For the countries in South America
we have three di⁄erent estimates of the extent of the frontier. For example, Table 1 shows
that for Colombia the narrow de￿nition of the frontier suggests that 62.9% of the territory
was frontier in 1850 and this exactly coincides with the wide de￿nition. Butland￿ s map gives
a fairly similar estimate of 58.1%. For other countries, however, the di⁄erences between these
estimates are much larger. For example, for Argentina the narrow de￿nition is 49.3% while
the wide one is 74.2%. The reason for this large di⁄erence is easy to see from Map 2. Here the
settled areas intersect with many departments. For instance the narrow de￿nition treats the
departments of San Luis, C￿rdoba, NeuquØn, Santiago del Estero and Salta as settled, while
the wide de￿nition treats them as frontier. For Argentina, Butland￿ s estimate is close to our
wide de￿nition. Finally, Map 3 looks at Central America and the Caribbean.
These calculations clearly illustrate our conjecture from the introduction which is that
simply in terms of the size of the frontier, the United States is not distinct. Uruguay had a
frontier which was quite a bit larger relative to the size of the country and Brazil￿ s frontier was
also larger. Other countries such as Costa Rica, Nicaragua or Venezuela had frontier￿ s which
were only about 15% or so less.
3 Other Data
Apart from the data we constructed on the extent of the frontier in 1850, we use some other
readily obtainable data. For our measure of historical political institutions we use constraints
on the executive in 1850 from the Polity IV Project.9 This variable is de￿ned as the extent of
institutional restrictions on decision making powers of the chief executive, whether individual
or collective. In a democracy constraints would come from the legislative or judicial branches
of government. In a dictatorship constraints may come from the ruling party in a one-party
system, a council of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, or maybe the military in polities
which are subject to the threat of military coups. The extent of constraints on the executive are
9http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
11coded as being between 1, meaning ￿unlimited executive authority￿and 7, implying ￿executive
parity or subordination.￿A country would be in the ￿rst category if ￿constitutional restrictions
on executive action are ignored￿or ￿there is no legislative assembly or there is one but it is
called or dismissed at the executive￿ s pleasure.￿A country would be in the latter category if ￿a
legislature, ruling party or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation￿or
￿the executive is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support
to remain in o¢ ce.￿
Figure 1 shows the distribution of constraints on the executive in 1850 for the 21 countries
in our dataset. One can see that 9 countries are assigned the minimum score of 1, while the
United States and Canada have the maximum score of 7.10 Interestingly for our hypothesis,
Costa Rica and Colombia both have scores of 3 in 1850. The country with constraints of 5 in
1850 is Honduras.
We also use the Polity IV Project￿ s measure of how democratic a country is, which they
refer to as the Polity IV score, which is the di⁄erence between the Polity￿ s Democracy and
Autocracy indices.11 The democracy index ranges from 0 to 10 and is derived from coding
the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment and constraints on the chief executive. The Polity Autocracy Index also ranges
from 0 to 10 and is constructed in a similar way to the democracy score based on scoring coun-
tries according to competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.
This implies that the Polity IV score ranges from -10 to 10.
The other data we use is GDP per-capita in 2007 PPP adjusted from the World Bank￿ s
World Development Indicators CD Rom and from the same source we also take information of
the Gini coe¢ cient for income distribution which we average over the period 1996-2005.
Table 2 shows some basic descriptive statistics of the data. The rows correspond to our
di⁄erent dependent and key explanatory variables and we divide the sample according to the
median extent of frontier land in 1850 according to our narrow de￿nition. The ￿rst set of
columns show the average data for countries with greater than median frontier land, while
the last set of columns in the table show the data for less than median frontier land. The
median country here is Mexico, 57% of whose land was frontier in 1850 according to our
narrow de￿nition. Note that for countries below the median the average amount of land which
10As previously noted, Polity data for Canada only starts in 1867, at which point it has a 7, which we used
as the its 1850 number.
11This measure is a very standard one in empirical work on democracy, and other de￿nitions typically give
very similar results (see Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared, 2008).
12was frontier was 32% (with a standard deviation of 0.22), while for countries above the median
the average proportion of frontier land was 70% (with standard deviation of 0.12).
The comparison of low and high frontier countries is quite revealing. For instance looking
at the third row of Table 2 we see that GDP per-capita in 2007 on average was $11,466 for
above median frontier societies, while it was only $3,744 for below median. The data shows
that those countries which had a relatively large frontier in 1850 now have substantially higher
income per-capita. In row 4 we show the average Polity IV score over the period 1900-2007.
This is 2.43 for above median countries and -0.35 for below median. In the next row we instead
look at the average Polity IV score for the period 1950-2007. Though there is a clear upward
trend in the extent of democracy, the comparison looks quite similar with above median frontier
countries which have an average polity score of 3.96 while below median countries have a score
of 1.05. As with income per-capita, there seems to be a clear pattern with countries which had
relatively large frontiers in 1850 being today more democratic than those which had relatively
small frontiers in 1850.
Finally, the last row examines average inequality over the period 1996-2005. The average
Gini coe¢ cient for high frontier countries is 49.1 while for low frontier countries it is 53.4.
Just as countries with relatively large frontiers are more prosperous and democratic, they also
appear to be more equal.
These raw numbers are quite consistent with the basic Frontier thesis. It is interesting
to examine them in ￿gures. Figure 2 plots the share of frontier (narrow de￿nition) against
GDP per-capita in 2007. There is a pronounced positively sloped relationship which remains
even if the United States and Canada are dropped. Figure 3 examines the raw relationship
between the share of frontier land against the Polity score over the period 1900-2007. The
picture is rather similar with a distinct positive correlation and with North America and Costa
Rica far o⁄ the regression line. Figure 4 shows the same picture but now with the Polity IV
score averaged over the post World War II period, 1950-2007. This is very similar to Figure 4.
Finally, Figure 5 examines inequality and the extent of the frontier. This Figure suggests that
there is a negative correlation between the extent of the frontier and contemporary inequality.
All of the above give support to the Turner Thesis. We now turn to regression analysis
to investigate how robust they are and whether these numbers may also be consistent with
our conditional Frontier thesis. As we shall see, the image which emerges from the descriptive
statistics and simple scatterplots is not general.
134 Empirical Results
We now examine some simple regression models to examine the long-run consequences for
economic and political development of having a frontier. In all cases we estimate Ordinary
Least Squares regressions of the form
yi = ￿ + ￿Fi;1850 + ￿Ci;1850 + ￿ (Fi;1850 ￿ Ci;1850) + "i (1)
where yi is the dependent variable of interest for country i. This is respectively GDP per-capita
in 2007, the democracy score of Polity averaged over di⁄erent periods, or the Gini coe¢ cient
of inequality averaged over some period. Fi;1850 is the proportion of the country which was
frontier land around 1850, Ci;1850 is constraints on the executive from Polity in 1850, and "i is a
disturbance term which we assume to have the usual properties. Here, following the discussion
above, we also allow for the interaction between constraints on the executive and frontier land
in 1850.
4.1 Income per-Capita
We ￿rst look at regressions where yi is GDP per-capita for country i in 2007. These are
recorded in Table 3. The table is split into three sets of columns where each set uses a di⁄erent
de￿nition of the frontier. The ￿rst three columns use our narrow de￿nition of the frontier, the
second three our wide de￿nition and the ￿nal three columns use the Butland de￿nition12.
The ￿rst column shows the most parsimonious OLS regression of GDP per-capita on the
proportion of land that was frontier in 1850. The coe¢ cient ￿ = 18324:1 (with a standard error
of 9953.3) is statistically signi￿cant. To see what this coe¢ cient implies, consider Mexico, which
is the median frontier country, with 57% of its territory comprised of frontier. This coe¢ cient
implies a GDP per-capita for Mexico of -1738 +18324￿0.57 = $8706, which is pretty close to the
actual value for Mexico which is $8340. The coe¢ cient on the frontier share implies that if one
changed the frontier from the median level to the level of the United States, which is 0.72, GDP
per-capita would increase by (0.72-0.57)￿18324=$2748, which is a 31% (=2748/8706) increase
of the predicted income for the median country. Alternatively, if Mexico￿ s frontier increased
by 10%, from 57% to 62.7%, income would increase by (0.627-0.57)￿18324=$1,044.5.
It is important to note, however, that one should be very cautious about proposing any type
of causal interpretation of the data. For example, we have treated the extent of the frontier in
1850 as econometrically exogenous, while in fact it may be the endogenous outcome of other
12Since the Butland data are only available for the South American countries, the Butland frontier de￿nition
uses the narrow frontier measure for the rest of the sample.
14factors that in￿ uence economic or political development. Perhaps countries that had good
fundamentals had expanded more, for instance by attracting greater numbers of migrants, and
thus tended to have relatively small frontiers in 1850. Of course if this form of omitted variable
bias were important, it actually suggests that we might be underestimating the e⁄ect of the
frontier because it suggests that relatively small frontiers ought to be associated with factors
that also lead to good long-run development. We are also treating constraints on the executive
as exogenous, which is again unlikely to be the case.
In column 2 we add constraints on the executive in 1850. This greatly increases the extent of
variation explained by the model and both constraints and frontier are signi￿cant, though the
estimated coe¢ cient on frontier falls. The coe¢ cient on constraints, ￿ = 4405:86 (s.e.=1346.5)
is statistically signi￿cant.
Column 3 then adds the interaction term. This term is highly signi￿cant, ￿ = 11843:7
(s.e.=3015.5) and the estimated coe¢ cient on frontier now changes sign so that ￿ = ￿13489:29
(s.e.=7835.69). One can see here that when constraints on the executive are equal to 1 (which
is the case in 9 out of our 21 countries in 1850) the total e⁄ect of frontier is ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1 =
￿13489:29 + 11843:7 = ￿1;645:59 < 0. In other words for countries with the lowest value
of constraints on the executive, representing ￿unlimited executive authority￿ the greater is
the relative size of the frontier in 1850, the poorer is the country today. However, as long as
constraints are 2 or above, frontier land is positively correlated with long-run growth.
It is also interesting to examine the quantitative impact of these results. For example, if
we held the extent of frontier ￿xed and increased the level of constraints on the executive in a
country from 1 to 7, then this would imply a change in income of
(￿13849 ￿ F1850) + (11843 ￿ F1850 ￿ 6) ￿ (3657 ￿ 6)
= (￿13849 ￿ F1850) + (71058 ￿ F1850) ￿ 21942 = (57209 ￿ F1850) ￿ 21942
Hence, a country with median frontier would increase its current income by 0.57￿57209-
21942=$10667 which would eliminate about one third of the income gap between Mexico
and the United States.
Columns 4-6 then re-estimate the same 3 models using our wide de￿nition of the frontier.
The results are very similar to those in the ￿rst three columns with the narrow de￿nition
except that now neither frontier nor constraints on the executive are signi￿cant when they are
entered with the interaction. The ￿nal three columns use the Butland de￿nition of the frontier
with similar results.
In all speci￿cations when we enter the interaction term it is robustly estimated and very
15signi￿cant and in all cases suggests that when constraints are at their minimum, the presence
of the frontier was bad for economic development, while at higher levels of constraints, the
frontier was good for long-run economic growth. The results in this section are not consistent
with the Frontier thesis but they are consisted with the conditional Frontier thesis.
4.2 Democracy
We now turn to regressions where yi is the Polity score for country i averaged over di⁄erent
periods. We look at two such periods, one is 1900-2007 and the other is 1950-2007. These
regressions are in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. As with Table 3, each table is split into three
sets of columns where each set uses a di⁄erent de￿nition of the frontier.
Table 4 column 1 shows the simplest regression of the Polity score 1900-2007 on frontier
in 1850. There is a signi￿cant positive correlation with ￿ = 8:189 (s.e.=2.458). The second
column adds constraints on the executive in 1850. Constraints are also signi￿cantly posi-
tively correlated with democracy in the 20th century with an estimated coe¢ cient of 1.474
(s.e.=0.195).
The third column then adds our interaction term. The interaction term is marginally
signi￿cant with a t-statistic of 1.78 and has a positive coe¢ cient of ￿ = 1:263. However, unlike
in the regressions where income per-capita was the dependent variable, the frontier share on
its own remains positive and signi￿cant, even if the magnitude of the coe¢ cient falls by 50%.
The rest of Table 4 shows that these results are not completely robust. The interaction
terms remains positive and basically signi￿cant, but when we use the wide de￿nition of the
frontier, frontier entered on its own is not statistically signi￿cant in column 6, or using the
Butland de￿nition in column 9. Nevertheless, there is no evidence here of any negative e⁄ect
of the frontier, unlike in the income regressions. The results in Table 4 suggest that even for
the lowest level of constraints on the executive, the greater was the frontier in 1850, the more
democratic the country was in the 20th century. Nevertheless, the quantitative e⁄ect is larger,
the greater are constraints in 1850.
In Table 5 we re-estimate the same models as in Table 4 except that now we average the
dependent variable only over the post World War II period. As is quickly seen this gives some
quite di⁄erent results. When we just control for frontier and constraints on the executive, the
results in terms of the size and signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients are very similar to those in Table
4. However, once we control for the interaction we ￿nd that the interaction term is never close
to signi￿cant while the estimated coe¢ cient on frontier on its own remains more or less the
same quantitatively and mostly signi￿cant (only marginally so in column 6). This table shows
16that the conditional e⁄ect on democracy is actually a phenomenon of the ￿rst half of the 20th
century. In the second half the simpler version of the Frontier thesis captures the patterns in
the data quite nicely.
4.3 Inequality
Finally, we let yi in (1) be the average Gini coe¢ cient for country i over the period 1990-
2007. The results of estimating this model are reported in Table 6. A quite robust pattern
emerges in all three sets of columns, irrespective of how we measure the extent of the frontier.
When entered on its own, frontier is negatively and signi￿cantly correlated with contemporary
income inequality, as are constraints on the executive. These results suggest that either having
a bigger frontier in 1850 or better political institutions is associated with lower inequality
today. However, as columns 3, 6 and 9 indicate, once the interaction term is included none of
the coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed what to our knowledge is the ￿rst test of the ￿ Frontier (or
Turner) thesis.￿ Turner argued that it was the existence of the frontier that generated the
particular path of development that the United States followed in the 19th century. Though
his work on the United States has been criticized, it still appears to heavily in￿ uence the ways
scholars think about these issues. The starting point of our assessment of this thesis is the
observation that every country in the Americas, with the possible exception of El Salvador and
Haiti, had a frontier in the 19th century. The United States was certainly not exceptional in
either this or the relative extent of the frontier. In consequence, seen in comparative context,
the existence of a frontier does not seem to be obviously correlated with long run economic
and political development.
We hypothesized, however, that there may be a conditional relationship between the extent
of the frontier and political institutions at the time of the allocation of frontier land. Historical
evidence suggests that even if most countries in the Americas had an open frontier, how that
frontier land was allocated di⁄ered a lot. For example, while the United States, Costa Rica and
Colombia passed Homestead Acts or something approximating them, in places like Argentina,
Chile or Guatemala, political elites allocated frontier lands to themselves or associates in a very
oligarchic manner. This indicates that the impact of the frontier might be conditional on the
existing political institutions which in￿ uenced how the land was allocated - a notion we dubbed
17the ￿ conditional Frontier thesis￿ . Our hypothesis suggests that if political institutions were bad
at the time of frontier settlement, the existence of such frontier land might actually lead to
worse development outcomes, probably because it provides a resource which non-democratic
political elites can use to cement themselves in power.
To investigate more systematically the relationship between the frontier and long-run de-
velopment we constructed measures of the extent of frontier land for 21 independent countries
in the Americas in 1850. Using some simple regressions we showed that the data does indeed
support our conditional hypothesis. With respect to both income per-capita today and democ-
racy over the 20th century, it is the interaction between the extent of the frontier in 1850 and
constraints on the executive in 1850 that plays the primary explanatory role. For example,
for a country with the lowest level of constraints on the executive, the larger is the relative
size of the frontier, the lower is GDP per-capita today. For countries with higher constraints,
however, a larger frontier is positively correlated with current GDP per-capita. With respect
to democracy we found that for a given level of constraints in 1850, greater size of the frontier
is correlated with greater democracy in the 20th century, though this e⁄ect comes primarily
from the ￿rst half of the century.
There are many caveats with these ￿ndings. For example, we did not control for variation
in the ￿ quality￿of the frontier. For instance there may be a big di⁄erence between Oklahoma
in the United States and the Atacama Desert in northern Chile, both of which were frontiers
in 1850. Still, the United States also had large areas of the Rocky Mountains which were not
high quality lands. Trying to control or adjust for this explicitly is an important area for future
research. Moreover, while 1850 seemed to us to be an interesting year to focus on because it
marked the beginning of the period of the rapid expansion of world trade which created such
huge frontier movements in the Americas, one could argue it is too late. An important area
for future research is a more intensive sensitivity analysis than is presented here.
Nevertheless, results suggest that the role of the frontier is much more complex than the
original Turner thesis suggests. The consequences of the existence of a frontier for di⁄erent
countries in the Americas depended a lot on the nature of political institutions which formed in
the early independence period. If these institutions featured few constraints on the executive,
having a frontier was actually bad for economic development. If El Salvador and Haiti had had
frontiers in the 19th century, this would have made them poorer today, not richer. Though we
found no such negative e⁄ect for democracy, we did ￿nd that the impact of the frontier on the
democratization of a society was conditional on initial political institutions. If Turner thought
that the United States frontier had a strong democratizing e⁄ect, this was only because it was
18in a country which already had good political institutions. This e⁄ect was severely muted in
Latin America.
Though our results are not consistent with a large part of the Turner thesis, they are con-
sistent with the research of Brenner (1976) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) which
emphasized that the implications of large shocks or new economic opportunities depends on
the initial institutional equilibrium. More speci￿cally in the Americas, they are also consistent
with the work of Engerman and Sokolo⁄ (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,
2002) who emphasized the critical importance of the creation of institutions in the colonial pe-
riod and their path dependent consequences. In a sense, our results on income per-capita show
how di⁄erent paths were reinforced by the availability of frontier lands in the 19th century.
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Argentina 24 2,780,403              11 1,370,454              49.3% 15 2,063,942              74.2% 1,922,371         69.1%
Bolivia 9 1,098,581              4 685,635                 62.4% 4 803,853                 73.2% 861,507            78.4%
Brazil 27 8,498,331              15 6,354,737              74.8% 17 7,192,601              84.6% 7,606,006         89.5%
Chile 13 756,095                 5 398,745                 52.7% 5 398,745                 52.7% 562,762            74.4%
Colombia 33 1,141,748              15 718,130                 62.9% 15 718,130                 62.9% 663,584            58.1%
Costa Rica 7 51,102                   4 32,870                   64.3% 5 43,011                   84.2% 32,870              64.3%
Dominican Republic 32 46,891                   0 -                         0.0% 2 3,665                     7.8%
Ecuador 23 256,370                 7 116,519                 45.4% 9 151,309                 59.0% 120,827            47.1%
El Salvador 14 21,040                   0 -                         0.0% 0 -                         0.0%
Guatemala 22 108,889                 2 44,892                   41.2% 7 69,692                   64.0%
Honduras 18 112,492                 3 45,262                   40.2% 6 64,904                   57.7%
Haiti 9 27,700                   0 -                         0.0% 0 -                         0.0%
Mexico 32 1,970,774              11 1,131,990              57.4% 12 1,207,619              61.3%
Nicaragua 17 120,339                 4 77,129                   64.1% 7 91,601                   76.1%
Panama 12 75,071                   6 35,102                   46.8% 7 46,773                   62.3%
Peru 25 1,285,199              4 595,813                 46.4% 7 709,235                 55.2% 786,028            61.2%
Paraguay 18 406,752                 3 246,925                 60.7% 13 378,370                 93.0% 365,955            90.0%
Uruguay 19 175,016                 19 175,016                 100.0% 19 175,016                 100.0% 175,016            100.0%
Venezuela 25 916,445                 6 598,945                 65.4% 8 707,231                 77.2% 655,533            71.5%
United States 51 9,372,587              6,792,227         72.5%
Canada 13 9,017,699              7,819,625         85.3%
The Frontier in the Americas
Source: www.geohive.com for land areas of subnational administrative units, Butland (1966), Dominion Bureau of Statistics (n.d), Gerlach, (1970), Bureau of Business Research (1975). Frontier coding calculated 
by the authors.
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yVariable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of Frontier Land circa 1850 11 0.700 0.127 0.574 1 10 0.322 0.225 0 0.527
Constraints on the Executive 1850 11 2.636 2.335 1 7 10 2.600 1.265 1 5
Per Capita Income 2007 11 11466.36 15725.61 980 46040 10 3744 2296.15 560 8350
Polity Score average 1900-2007 11 2.427 5.325 -3.537 10 10 -0.350 1.935 -3.107 2.333
Polity Score average 1950-2007 11 3.964 5.008 -3.293 10 10 1.052 2.482 -5.339 3.828
Income Gini average 1996-2005 11 49.113 8.389 32.560 58.770 10 53.435 2.614 50.630 59.2
Countries with Frontier Share >= Sample Median Frontier Share Countries with Frontier Share < Sample Median Frontier Share
Descriptive Statistics
Note: The sample median country for Frontier Share is Mexico, with a frontier share of 0.574 (based on our prefered measure of frontier). For the years in which the Polity score records a political transition we asign 
the average score of the years before and after the transition, and years in which the Polity score assigns Interruption or Interregnum periods are excluded from the averages. 
Table 2Figure 2









































































































































































































































18324.10 15777.35 -13849.29 10535.48 10397.26 -12590.71 12611.73 14272.81 -10397.47
(9953.30) (4900.72) (7835.69) (6043.12) (3884.45) (8253.17) (6934.05) (4840.60) (6118.02)
4405.86 -3657.29 4579.16 -3029.61 4708.54 -2663.75
(1346.50) (2228.71) (1526.40) (3360.24) (1371.11) (2332.80)
11843.70 10391.53 10341.30
(3015.50) (3765.30) (2880.38)
R-squared 0.162 0.631 0.773 0.061 0.571 0.655 0.094 0.632 0.738
No. Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
All regressions include a constant (omitted).
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP 2007 (PPP Adjusted)
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier Butland Frontier
Frontier Share
Constraints on the Executive 1850
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. Table 4
Frontier Share 8.189 7.337 4.178 5.886 5.839 0.281 5.608 6.176 3.159
(2.458) (1.297) (2.243) (2.317) (1.789) (2.975) (2.180) (1.424) (2.454)
Constraints on the Executive 1850 1.474 0.615 1.554 -0.285 1.611 0.710
(0.195) (0.552) (0.240) (0.798) (0.192) (0.487)
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share 1.263 2.512 1.265
(0.708) (1.074) (0.706)
R-squared 0.256 0.672 0.685 0.151 0.617 0.655 0.147 0.646 0.659
No. Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
All regressions include a constant (omitted).
The Polity score for Panama is average over the 1903-2007 period.
Dependent Variable: Polity IV Score, average 1900-2007
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier Butland FrontierTable 5
Frontier Share 8.213 7.455 9.809 5.822 5.780 6.474 5.304 5.815 7.597
(2.960) (1.851) (2.676) (3.119) (2.151) (4.388) (2.873) (1.865) (3.866)
Constraints on the Executive 1850 1.313 1.954 1.394 1.624 1.448 1.980
(0.254) (0.959) (0.282) (1.197) (0.252) (1.080)
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share -0.941 -0.314 -0.747
(1.120) (1.514) (1.354)
R-squared 0.262 0.599 0.606 0.150 0.533 0.533 0.134 0.545 0.550
No. Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
All regressions include a constant (omitted).
Dependent Variable: Polity IV Score, average 1950-2007
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier Butland FrontierTable 6
Frontier Share -10.585 -9.579 -2.755 -7.086 -7.030 -1.901 -5.923 -6.596 1.723
(5.632) (4.126) (7.922) (4.628) (3.520) (8.094) (4.897) (3.707) (9.226)
Constraints on the Executive 1850 -1.740 0.117 -1.845 -0.147 -1.906 0.580
(0.676) (1.745) (0.767) (2.347) (0.745) (2.220)
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share -2.728 -2.319 -3.487
(2.727) (3.523) (3.207)
R-squared 0.177 0.417 0.442 0.091 0.362 0.376 0.068 0.358 0.397
No. Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. 
All regressions include a constant (omitted).
Dependent Variable: Income Gini, average 1996-2005





Country Cartographic Source Historical References
Argentina Butland (1966) Eidt (1971), Bandeira, (2006), Jefferson, (1926), Moniz (2006)
Bolivia Butland (1966) Gill (1987), Fifer (1982)
Brazil Butland (1966) Bandeira (2006), Katzman (1977), Katzman (1975), James (1941)
Canada Dominion Bureau of Statistics (n.d).  Silver (1969), Landon (1967)
Chile Butland (1966) James (1941), Villalobos (1992)
Colombia Butland (1966) James (1941), LeGrand (1986), Rausch (1993)
Costa Rica
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States 
Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), James (1941),
Dominican Rep. United States Bureau of the Census (1956b) Lora (2002)
Ecuador Butland (1966) Dueñas (1986), Sampedro (1990)
El Salvador
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States 
Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003)
Guatemala
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States 
Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), McCreery (1976)
Haiti United States Bureau of the Census (1956b) Anglade (1982)
Honduras
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States 
Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), Davidson (2006)
Mexico Bureau of Business Research (1975) Bernstein (1964)
Nicaragua
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States 
Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), Aguirre (2002)
Panama
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States 
Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003)
Paraguay Butland (1966) Moniz (2006)
Peru Butland (1966) Milla (1995)
United States
United States Census Office (1898), 
Gerlach, (1970)
Billington (2001), Billington (1962), Wyman and Kroeber (1965)
Uruguay Butland (1966) Moniz (2006), Bollo (1896)
Venezuela Butland (1966)
Sources for FrontierCountry Province/State/Department
Land Area 
(square Kms.)
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier
BUENOS AIRES 307,571                0 1
CATAMARCA 102,602                0 0
CHACO 99,633                  1 1
CHUBUT 224,686                1 1
CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES 203                       0 0
CÓRDOBA 165,321                1 1
CORRIENTES 88,199                  1 1
ENTRE RÍOS 78,781                  1 1
FORMOSA 72,066                  1 1
JUJUY 53,219                  0 0
LA PAMPA 143,440                1 1
LA RIOJA 89,680                  0 0
MENDOZA 148,827                0 0
MISIONES 29,801                  1 1
NEUQUÉN 94,078                  0 1
RÍO NEGRO 203,013                1 1
SALTA 155,488                0 1
SAN JUAN 89,651                  0 0
SAN LUIS 76,748                  0 0
SANTA CRUZ 243,943                1 1
SANTA FE 133,007                0 0
SANTIAGO DE ESTERO 136,351                0 1
TIERRA DEL FUEGO 21,571                  1 1
TUCUMÁN 22,524                  0 0
BENI 213,564                1 1
CHUQUISACA 51,524                  0 0
COCHABAMBA 55,631                  0 0
LA PAZ 133,985                0 0
ORURO 53,588                  0 0
PANDO 63,827                  1 1
POTOSÍ 118,218                0 1
SANTA CRUZ 370,621                1 1
TARIJA 37,623                  1 1
ACRE 152,522                1 1
ALAGOAS 27,819                  0 0
AMAPÁ 142,816                1 1
AMAZONAS 1,570,947             1 1
BAHIA 564,272                0 0
CEARÁ 145,712                0 0
DISTRITO FEDERAL 5,802                    1 1
ESPÍRITO SANTO 46,047                  0 0
GOIÁS 340,119                1 1
MARANHÃO 331,919                1 1
MATO GROSSO 903,385                1 1
MATO GROSSO DO SUL 357,140                1 1
MINAS GERAIS 586,553                0 1
PARÁ 1,247,703             1 1
PARAÍBA 56,341                  0 0
PARANÁ 199,282                1 1
PERNAMBUCO 98,526                  0 0
PIAUÍ 251,311                0 1
RIO DE JANEIRO 43,797                  0 0
RIO GRANDE DO NORTE 53,077                  0 0
RIO GRANDE DO SUL 268,836                1 1
RONDÔNIA 237,565                1 1
RORAIMA 224,118                1 1
SANTA CATARINA 95,286                  1 1
SÃO PAULO 248,177                0 0
SERGIPE 21,962                  0 0
TOCANTINS 277,297                1 1
ANTOFAGASTA (II) 126,049                0 0
ATACAMA (III) 75,176                  0 0
AYSÉN (XI) 108,494                1 1
BÍO-BÍO (VIII) 37,063                  0 0
COQUIMBO (IV) 40,580                  0 0
LA ARAUCANÍA (IX) 31,842                  1 1
LOS LAGOS (X) 67,013                  1 1
MAGALLANES Y ANTÁRTICA CHILENA (XII) 132,297                1 1
MAULE (VII) 30,296                  0 0
O'HIGGINS (VI) 16,387                  0 0
SANTIAGO 15,403                  0 0
TARAPACÁ (I) 59,099                  1 1
VALPARAÍSO (V) 16,396                  0 0
AMAZONAS 109,665                1 1
ANTIOQUIA 63,612                  0 0
ARAUCA 23,818                  1 1
ATLANTICO 3,388                    0 0
BOGOTA 1,587                    0 0
BOLIVAR 25,978                  0 0
BOYACA 23,189                  0 0
CALDAS 7,888                    1 1
CAQUETA 88,965                  1 1
CASANARE 44,640                  1 1
CAUCA 29,308                  0 0
CESAR 22,905                  0 0
CHOCO 46,530                  1 1
CORDOBA 25,020                  0 0
CUNDINAMARCA 22,623                  0 0
GUAINIA 72,238                  1 1
GUAJIRA 20,848                  0 0
GUAVIARE 42,327                  1 1
HUILA 19,890                  0 0
MAGDALENA 23,188                  0 0
META 85,635                  1 1
NARIÑO 33,268                  0 0
NORTE DE SANTANDER 21,658                  0 0
PUTUMAYO 24,885                  1 1
QUINDIO 1,845                    1 1
RISARALDA 4,140                    1 1
SAN ANDRES 44                         1 1
SANTANDER 30,537                  0 0
SUCRE 10,917                  0 0
TOLIMA 23,562                  0 0
VALLE DEL CAUCA 22,140                  0 0
VAUPES 65,268                  1 1
VICHADA 100,242                1 1






ALAJUELA 9,758                    1 1
CARTAGO 3,125                    0 0
GUANACASTE 10,141                  0 1
HEREDIA 2,657                    1 1
LIMÓN 9,189                    1 1
PUNTARENAS 11,266                  1 1
SAN JOSÉ 4,966                    0 0
AZUA 2,688                    0 0
BAHORUCO 1,244                    0 0
BARAHONA 1,647                    0 1
DAJABÓN 1,004                    0 0
DISTRITO NACIONAL 91                         0 0
DUARTE 1,640                    0 0
EL SEIBO 1,775                    0 0
ELIAS PIÑA 1,397                    0 0
ESPAILLAT 825                       0 0
HATO MAYOR 1,324                    0 0
INDEPENDENCIA 1,754                    0 0
LA ALTAGRACIA 3,001                    0 0
LA ROMANA 656                       0 0
LA VEGA 2,274                    0 0
MARÍA TRINIDAD SÁNCHEZ 1,212                    0 0
MONSEÑOR NOUEL 992                       0 0
MONTE CRISTI 1,886                    0 0
MONTE PLATA 2,613                    0 0
PEDERNALES 2,018                    0 1
PERAVIA 785                       0 0
PUERTO PLATA 819                       0 0
SALCEDO 430                       0 0
SAMANÁ 845                       0 0
SAN CRISTÓBAL 1,240                    0 0
SAN JOSE DE OCOA 853                       0 0
SAN JUAN 3,360                    0 0
SAN PEDRO DE MACORÍS 1,255                    0 0
SÁNCHEZ RAMÍREZ 1,191                    0 0
SANTIAGO 2,809                    0 0
SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ 1,152                    0 0
SANTO DOMINGO 1,302                    0 0
VALVERDE 809                       0 0
AZUAY 7,995                    0 0
BOLÍVAR 3,926                    0 0
CAÑAR 3,142                    0 0
CARCHI 3,750                    0 0
CHIMBORAZO 6,470                    0 0
COTOPAXI 5,985                    0 0
EL ORO 5,817                    0 0
ESMERALDAS 15,896                  0 1
GALÁPAGOS 8,010                    0 0
GUAYAS 20,566                  0 0
IMBABURA 4,615                    0 0
LOJA 10,995                  0 0
LOS RÍOS 7,151                    0 0
MANABÍ 18,894                  0 1
MORONA SANTIAGO 23,797                  1 1
NAPO 12,483                  1 1
ORELLANA 21,675                  1 1
PASTAZA 29,325                  1 1
PICHINCHA 13,270                  0 0
REGIÓN ZONAS NO DELIMITADAS 775                       1 1
SUCUMBÍOS 18,008                  1 1
TUNGURAHUA 3,369                    0 0
ZAMORA CHINCHIPE 10,456                  1 1
AHUACHAPÁN 1,240                    0 0
CABAÑAS 1,104                    0 0
CHALATENANGO 2,017                    0 0
CUSCATLÁN 756                       0 0
LA LIBERTAD 1,653                    0 0
LA PAZ 1,224                    0 0
LA UNIÓN 2,074                    0 0
MORAZÁN 1,447                    0 0
SAN MIGUEL 2,077                    0 0
SAN SALVADOR 886                       0 0
SAN VICENTE 1,184                    0 0
SANTA ANA 2,023                    0 0
SONSONATE 1,225                    0 0
USULUTÁN 2,130                    0 0
ALTA VERAPAZ 8,686                    0 1
BAJA VERAPAZ 3,124                    0 1
CHIMALTENANGO 1,979                    0 0
CHIQUIMULA 2,376                    0 0
EL PETÉN 35,854                  1 1
EL PROGRESO 1,922                    0 1
EL QUICHÉ 8,378                    0 1
ESCUINTLA 4,384                    0 0
GUATEMALA 2,126                    0 0
HUEHUETENANGO 7,400                    0 0
IZABAL 9,038                    1 1
JALAPA 2,063                    0 0
JUTIAPA 3,219                    0 0
QUETZALTENANGO 1,951                    0 0
RETALHULEU 1,856                    0 0
SACATEPÉQUEZ 465                       0 0
SAN MARCOS 3,791                    0 0
SANTA ROSA 2,955                    0 0
SOLOLÁ 1,061                    0 0
SUCHITEPÉQUEZ 2,510                    0 0
TOTONICAPÁN 1,061                    0 0





ECUADORATLÁNTIDA 4,372                    0 1
CHOLUTECA 3,923                    0 0
COLÓN 4,360                    1 1
COMAYAGUA 8,249                    0 0
COPÁN 5,124                    0 0
CORTÉS 3,242                    0 0
EL PARAÍSO 7,489                    0 1
FRANCISCO MORAZÁN 8,619                    0 0
GRACIAS A DIOS 16,997                  1 1
INTIBUCÁ 3,123                    0 0
ISLAS DE LA BAHÍA 236                       0 0
LA PAZ 2,525                    0 0
LEMPIRA 4,228                    0 0
OCOTEPEQUE 1,630                    0 0
OLANCHO 23,905                  1 1
SANTA BÁRBARA 5,024                    0 0
VALLE 1,665                    0 0
YORO 7,781                    0 1
ARTIBONITE 4,984                    0 0
CENTRE 3,675                    0 0
GRAND' ANSE 3,310                    0 0
NORD 2,106                    0 0
NORD-EST 1,805                    0 0
NORD-OUEST 2,176                    0 0
OUEST 4,827                    0 0
SUD 2,794                    0 0
SUD-EST 2,023                    0 0
AGUASCALIENTES 5,569                    0 0
BAJA CALIFORNIA NORTE 70,113                  1 1
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR 73,677                  1 1
CAMPECHE 56,859                  1 1
CHIAPAS 75,629                  0 1
CHIHUAHUA 247,087                1 1
COAHUILA DE ZARAGOZA 151,571                1 1
COLIMA 5,455                    0 0
DISTRITO FEDERAL 1,499                    0 0
DURANGO 119,648                1 1
GUANAJUATO 30,350                  0 0
GUERRERO 63,749                  0 0
HIDALGO 20,987                  0 0
JALISCO 80,137                  0 0
MÉXICO, ESTADO DE 21,461                  0 0
MICHOACÁN DE OCAMPO 59,864                  0 0
MORELOS 4,941                    0 0
NAYARIT 27,336                  0 0
NUEVO LÉON 64,555                  0 0
OAXACA 94,964                  0 0
PUEBLA 33,919                  0 0
QUERÉTARO DE ARTEAGA 11,769                  0 0
QUINTANA ROO 50,843                  1 1
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ 60,547                  0 0
SINALOA 58,092                  1 1
SONORA 184,934                1 1
TABASCO 24,661                  0 0
TAMAULIPAS 79,829                  1 1
TLAXCALA 4,061                    0 0
VERACRUZ-LLAVE 72,815                  0 0
YUCATÁN 39,337                  1 1
ZACATECAS 74,516                  0 0
BOACO 4,177                    0 1
CARAZO 1,081                    0 0
CHINANDEGA 4,822                    0 0
CHONTALES 6,481                    0 0
ESTELÍ 2,230                    0 0
GRANADA 1,040                    0 0
JINOTEGA 9,222                    1 1
LEÓN 5,138                    0 0
MADRIZ 1,708                    0 0
MANAGUA 3,465                    0 0
MASAYA 611                       0 0
MATAGALPA 6,804                    0 1
NUEVA SEGOVIA 3,491                    0 1
REGION AUTÓNOMA ATLÁNTICO NORTE 33,106                  1 1
REGION AUTÓNOMA ATLÁNTICO SUR 27,260                  1 1
RÍO SAN JUAN 7,541                    1 1
RIVAS 2,162                    0 0
BOCAS DEL TORO 4,644                    1 1
CHIRIQUÍ 6,548                    0 0
COCLÉ 4,927                    0 0
COLÓN 4,868                    1 1
COMARCA EMBERÁ 4,384                    1 1
COMARCA KUNA YALA 2,341                    1 1
COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ 6,968                    1 1
DARIÉN 11,897                  1 1
HERRERA 2,341                    0 0
LOS SANTOS 3,805                    0 0
PANAMÁ 11,671                  0 1






AMAZONAS 39,249                  1 1
ANCASH 35,915                  0 0
AREQUIPA 63,345                  0 0
AYACUCHO 43,815                  0 0
CAJAMARCA 33,318                  0 0
CUSCO 71,987                  0 0
DEPARTAMENTO APURÍMAC 20,896                  0 0
EL CALLAO 147                       0 0
HUANCAVELICA 22,131                  0 0
HUÁNUCO 36,849                  0 1
ICA 21,328                  0 0
JUNÍN 44,197                  0 0
LA LIBERTAD 25,500                  0 0
LAMBAYEQUE 14,213                  0 0
LIMA 34,802                  0 0
LORETO 368,852                1 1
MADRE DE DIOS 85,301                  1 1
MOQUEGUA 15,734                  0 0
PASCO 25,320                  0 1
PIURA 35,892                  0 0
PUNO 71,999                  0 0
SAN MARTÍN 51,253                  0 1
TACNA 16,076                  0 0
TUMBES 4,669                    0 0
UCAYALI 102,411                1 1
ALTO PARAGUAY 82,349                  1 1
ALTO PARANÁ 14,895                  0 1
AMAMBAY 12,933                  0 1
ASUNCIÓN 117                       0 0
BOQUERÓN 91,669                  1 1
CAAGUAZÚ 11,474                  0 1
CAAZAPÁ 9,496                    0 1
CANINDEYÚ 14,667                  0 1
CENTRAL 2,465                    0 0
CONCEPCIÓN 18,051                  0 1
CORDILLERA 4,948                    0 0
GUAIRÁ 3,846                    0 1
ITAPÚA 16,525                  0 1
MISIONES 9,556                    0 1
ÑEEMBUCÚ 12,147                  0 0
PARAGUARÍ 8,705                    0 0
PRESIDENTE HAYES 72,907                  1 1
SAN PEDRO 20,002                  0 1
ARTIGAS 11,928                  1 1
CANELONES 4,536                    1 1
CERRO LARGO 13,648                  1 1
COLONIA 6,106                    1 1
DURAZNO 11,643                  1 1
FLORES 5,144                    1 1
FLORIDA 10,417                  1 1
LAVALLEJA 10,016                  1 1
MALDONADO 4,793                    1 1
MONTEVIDEO 530                       1 1
PAYSANDÚ 13,922                  1 1
RÍO NEGRO 9,282                    1 1
RIVERA 9,370                    1 1
ROCHA 10,551                  1 1
SALTO 14,163                  1 1
SAN JOSÉ 4,992                    1 1
SORIANO 9,008                    1 1
TACUAREMBÓ 15,438                  1 1
TREINTA Y TRES 9,529                    1 1
AMAZONAS 180,145                1 1
ANZOÁTEGUI 43,300                  0 1
APURE 76,500                  1 1
ARAGUA 7,014                    0 0
BARINAS 35,200                  1 1
BOLÍVAR 238,000                1 1
CARABOBO 4,650                    0 0
COJEDES 14,800                  0 0
DELTA AMACURO 40,200                  1 1
DEPENDENCIAS FEDERALES (DF) 120                       0 0
DISTRITO FEDERAL 433                       0 0
FALCÓN 24,800                  0 0
GUÁRICO 64,986                  0 1
LARA 19,800                  0 0
MÉRIDA 11,300                  0 0
MIRANDA 7,950                    0 0
MONAGAS 28,900                  1 1
NUEVA ESPARTA 1,150                    0 0
PORTUGUESA 15,200                  0 0
SUCRE 11,800                  0 0
TÁCHIRA 11,100                  0 0
TRUJILLO 7,400                    0 0
VARGAS 1,497                    0 0
YARACUY 7,100                    0 0
ZULIA 63,100                  0 0
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
PERU
PARAGUAY